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Juveniles Make Bad Decisions, But Are
Not Adults & Law Continues to Account For
This Difference: The Supreme Court’s
Decision to Apply Miller v. Alabama
Retroactively Will Have a Significant Impact
on Many Decades of Reform and Current
Debate Around Juvenile Sentencing
Danielle Petretta,* Comment
Introduction
In January 2016, the Supreme Court made a monumental
decision, reflecting the notion that juveniles are not adults.
For years, courts have been grappling with the notion that
juveniles are not adults. The Supreme Court has finally
published an opinion that will have extreme implications on
the juvenile justice system.
Imagine this scenario: A 12-year-old high school student
grows up in a low-income neighborhood in tough economic
conditions. She has a tumultuous relationship with her
parents. She has friends at school, and like most young girls,
she has self-esteem issues. She finally gets a boyfriend. Her
13-year-old boyfriend decides that he wants to do something
fun. Because she would do anything to make him happy, she
decides to go along with him to his neighbor’s house. Her
boyfriend wants to steal money from him, and he needs her to
be a distraction.
While inside, the girl speaks briefly with the neighbor and
the boyfriend asks to use the bathroom so that he can look for
the money. After the neighbor hears a suspicious noise coming
from his bedroom, he stops speaking to the girl and finds the
boyfriend stealing. The boyfriend panics and grabs a baseball
bat that he sees in the corner of the room and hits him on the
head. The neighbor ultimately dies from the blow.
Do you know what could have resulted if this happened
before the case of Miller v. Alabama in 2012? This 12-year-old
765
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girl, who could not even get a flu shot without a parent’s
permission, could have been tried in an adult court and
sentenced to life without parole.
Furthermore, up until
January 2016, she would be spending her entire life behind
bars and would never have the chance of an early release.
Part I of this Note will discuss the birth of the juvenile
justice system. Part II of this Note will briefly introduce the
recent oral argument heard before the Supreme Court
regarding whether the Supreme Court will apply Miller v.
Alabama retroactively or non-retroactively. Part III will
discuss the history of the juvenile justice system and show the
progression of Supreme Court decisions regarding juveniles in
the penal system. Part IV will discuss how neuroscience
throughout the years has incessantly proven that juveniles are
inherently different than adults. Part V will discuss and
analyze the Miller decision and its effects, and Part VI will
discuss the many implications that the recent Supreme Court
decision to apply Miller retroactively has on the entire future of
the juvenile justice system.
I. Background
Until the end of the 18th century, juveniles were sent to
both jails and penitentiaries.1 However, at the time, a separate
system for juveniles did not exist, so juveniles were sent to
serve their sentences in worn-out, overcrowded institutions
with adult criminals.2 Children were treated as adults and a
child as young as seven (known then as the age of reason),
could be sentenced as an adult and even receive a death
sentence.3
* Danielle Petretta, J.D. '17, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University. I wish to thank Professor Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, who
encouraged me to delve into this area of law, and Professor Michael Mushlin,
who continues to be a mentor and source of encouragement throughout my
law school career.
1. Juvenile Justice History, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST.,
http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) [hereinafter Juvenile Justice History].
2. Id.
3. SHAY BILCHIK, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 NAT’L REPORT SERIES: JUVENILE

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9

2

2017

JUVENILE SENTENCING

767

Eventually, reformers began to take center stage as
catalysts for changing the way juveniles were treated.4 In
1825, the work of reformers Thomas Eddy and John Griscom
led to the creation of the New York House of Refuge, which
housed over 1,000 youths.5 These Houses of Refuge were
essentially the foundation for what later developed into the
juvenile justice system.6 By the 1840s, around twenty-five
houses were constructed in urban areas in major cities
throughout the country.7 The houses were “large fortress-like
congregate style institution[s],” which on average housed
around 200 juveniles.8 These establishments were created with
the hope of rehabilitating, rather than punishing, juveniles in a
system of adult criminals.9
As a result of the Juvenile Court Act of 1899, the first
juvenile court was formed in Cook County, Illinois.10 The
doctrine of parens patriae, or “state as parent” governed the
way in which juvenile courts were to conduct proceedings on
behalf of juveniles.11 The idea was that the state had “the
inherent power and responsibility to provide protection for
children [because they lack full legal capacity].”12 The main
focus turned to the welfare of the child,13 and the proceedings
were more informal, with each judge having vast discretion
over each particular case.14
The 1960s brought more reform to the rapidly-developing
juvenile system; the courts became more formal, especially in
situations where the court could either waive the juvenile to

JUSTICE BULLETIN 2 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178995.pdf.
4. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., Part 1: The History of Juvenile Justice, in
DIALOGUE
ON
YOUTH
AND
JUSTICE
4,
4-5
(2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DY
Jpart1.authcheckdam.pdf.
10. See BILCHIK, supra note 3, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.
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adult court or give him or her a longer sentence.15 The courts
also afforded juveniles more due process protections, such as
the right to counsel.16 In Kent v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that a juvenile was entitled to a hearing and the
records of the juvenile court’s waiver decision.17 In re Gault
further expanded a juvenile delinquent’s rights to include: the
right to notice of the charges,18 right to counsel,19 the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination,20 and the right to
cross-examine witnesses.21
Beginning in the 1980s, the public perception was that the
juvenile crime rate was increasing and the juvenile system was
not stringent enough on juveniles, which led to the institution
of mandatory sentences and automatic transfers to adult
court.22 In 1986, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which
disregarded mitigating factors, became part of the reform
movement.23 The 1990s were even tougher on juveniles,24
largely in part because of the superpredator concept that
developed.25 Princeton Professor John Dilulio coined the term
“superpredator,” to refer to the increase of juveniles who
completely disregarded human life and had no remorse in
committing violent acts, which quickly sparked media craze.26
This myth continued to spiral as James Wilson and John
Dilulio predicted that by the end of 2000, one million more
juveniles, ages fourteen to seventeen, will exist than in 1995.27
Did these superpredators ever exist? No. In fact, the
notion of a large group of juveniles never came to fruition, and
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
18. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
19. Id. at 40-41.
20. Id. at 55.
21. Id. at 57.
22. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.
23. Alison Powers, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory
Sentencing of Juveniles Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a
Mitigating Factor, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 252-53 (2009).
24. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.
25.
JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 3, 4 (2d ed. 2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9

4

2017

JUVENILE SENTENCING

769

several researchers have invalidated the myth and found major
flaws in Wilson’s and Dilulio’s predictions.28 In fact, adults
were responsible for two-thirds of the increase in murders and
three-fourths of the increase in violent crimes committed
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.29 Nonetheless, the
1990s were “a time of unprecedented change as State
legislatures crack[ed] down on juvenile crime.”30 Juveniles
were treated more like criminals with easier transfer
provisions, more sentencing options, and more open access to
records and court proceedings.31 Juveniles were confined much
more, and many institutions became overcrowded.32
II. Current Debate in the Supreme Court: Montgomery v.
Alabama Revisited
On October 13, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on a 70-year-old case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, in
which the Supreme Court “ultimately determine[d] whether
some 2,100 people serving life terms for committing murder
when they were juveniles have any chance of ever getting out
of prison.”33 These oral arguments resulted from the Supreme
Court decision in 2012, Miller v. Alabama, which ruled that
mandatory life without parole for juveniles under the age of
eighteen at the time of the offense constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, because such a scheme does not allow
consideration of the ability to change or decrease culpability.34
However, “Miller did not provide nuanced answers to how
[these factors] matter,” nor did the Supreme Court address
whether or not the ruling would apply retroactively.35 The two
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 10.
30. See BILCHIK, supra note 3, at 5.
31. Id.
32. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.
33. Nina Totenberg, Will Supreme Court Allow Juvenile Life Sentence
Ruling to Be Retroactive?, NPR (Oct. 13, 2015, 5:14 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/13/448182651/will-supreme-court-allow-juvenilelife-sentence-ruling-to-be-retroactive.
34. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012).
35. Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of
Miller and Jackson: Obtaining Relief In Court and Before the Parole Board,
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most recent issues before the Supreme Court are whether
Miller will apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, and
whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine
whether Louisiana correctly decided to apply Miller
retroactively.36
III. History of the Juvenile Justice System
A. Monumental Supreme Court Decisions Paving the Road for
True Juvenile Justice
The Eighth Amendment has been a vital component in the
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding juvenile detention. The
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has woven its
way into the Court’s rationale in the majority of cases
regarding juvenile sentencing. The Eighth Amendment states
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”37 In
Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court stated that they “had little
occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment, and,
in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not
surprising.”38 Furthermore, the Court stated that the Eighth
Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”39
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma
In 1988, The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma
ruled that imposing the death penalty on a minor, under the
age of sixteen, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.40 This case dealt with a 15-year-old boy, acting
31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 369-70 (2013).
36. Montgomery v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/montgomery-v-louisiana/
visited Mar. 6, 2017).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
38. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
39. Id. at 101.
40. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
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in concert with others, who participated in his brother-in-law’s
murder.41 The victim was shot twice, cut in several areas, and
his body was chained to concrete and left at the bottom of a
river.42
The Court held that to determine whether a minor should
receive the death penalty, a court must look to the “legislative
enactments” and “jury determinations” to consider why “these
indicators of contemporary standards of decency” may lead to a
conclusion that “such a young person is not capable of acting
with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate
penalty.”43
As support for the general proposition that there are
inherent differences when dealing with the rights of children,
the Court looked to Oklahoma statutes.44 The Court looked at
the fact that “a minor is not eligible to vote, to sit on a jury, to
marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or
cigarettes.”45 Additionally, the Court noted that because
juveniles are inexperienced, less educated, and less intelligent,
they are less likely to appreciate the consequences of their
actions and are more apt to submitting to peer pressure.46
Ultimately the Court looked at the two main purposes of the
death penalty – retribution and deterrence – in deciding
“[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the
teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary
obligations to its children . . .”47 imposing the death penalty
would be an “unconstitutional punishment.”48
2. Stanford v. Kentucky
One year after Thompson was decided, the Supreme Court
ruled that the death penalty could be constitutionally imposed
on a juvenile who commits murder at either sixteen or
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 819.
Id.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823-24.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 838.
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seventeen years old.49 In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court held
that the death penalty for a juvenile offender, who is at least
sixteen years old, does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.50 Two consolidated
cases were joined before the Court: the first case involved a 17year-old boy and an accomplice who raped, sodomized, and
killed a 20-year-old gas station attendant, and the second case
involved a 16-year-old boy who stabbed a 26-year-old
convenience store owner.51
Petitioners’ argument that the death penalty runs contrary
to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society” failed because they did not show the
standards of decency of “modern American society as a whole”52
and because they did not fulfill their burden in showing a
national consensus that disfavors such a penalty.53 While the
Court in Thompson noted the importance of statutes when
recognizing the difference in how the law treats juveniles
differently, the Court in Stanford boldly veered away from that
argument. The Court stated that it is “absurd to think that one
must be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink responsibly,
or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to
understand that murdering another human being is profoundly
wrong, and to conform one’s conduct to that most minimal of all
civilized standards.”54 The Court, here, also surprisingly
rejected ideas coming from socio-scientific data regarding
juvenile culpability: “The battle must be fought, then, on the
field of the Eighth Amendment; and in that struggle
socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific
evidence is not an available weapon.”55

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 369 (citation omitted).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 378.
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3. Roper v. Simmons
A few years following Stanford, the Supreme Court began
to make major changes in the way juveniles were sentenced
and viewed in the system. Roper v. Simmons established that
imposing the death penalty for juveniles under the age of
eighteen is unconstitutional.56
The Court relied on the
reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia, which ruled the death penalty
for the mentally disabled to be violative of the Eighth
Amendment.57 The Supreme Court in Roper used the Atkins’
Court factors, “objective indicia of [national] consensus” and
the “Court’s own determination in the exercise of its
independent judgment,” to reach the conclusion that the death
penalty is too inappropriate of a punishment for juveniles.58
The Court concluded that juveniles are less culpable than
adults due to the “objective indicia of national consensus . . .
the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of
States; the infrequency of its use . . . and the consistency in the
trend toward abolition of the practice . . . .”59 Additionally, the
Court noted that although the crimes committed by juveniles
cannot and should be not overlooked, capital punishment is
only meant for heinous crimes committed with extreme
culpability.60 The Court’s reasoning was that if juveniles are
more susceptible to irresponsible behavior, are more vulnerable
and lack control in their surroundings, and are struggling to
find their identities, they “cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders” deserving of capital punishment.61
The Court also recognized that the most brutal crimes could
potentially override mitigating factors, such as vulnerability,
youth, and immaturity.62 However, a state cannot take a
juvenile’s life, because society has deemed eighteen to be the
age of maturity, and that is “the age at which the line for death
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 573.
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eligibility ought to rest.”63
After Stanford, Roper v. Simmons revitalizes the notion
that juveniles are different and under the law, must be treated
differently. However, Roper is “enlightening because the Court
recognizes that identity is an appropriately critical factor
separating adults from juveniles for the purposes of
punishment. Yet [it] is flawed in terms of the Court’s shallow
effort to provide support for its reasoning . . . . “64
4. Graham v. Florida
In 2010, the Supreme Court made yet another
monumental stride in reforming juvenile justice. Graham v.
Florida established that life without parole for juveniles who
committed non-homicidal offenses violated the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.65 The
Court held that if a state does impose a life sentence, it does
not need to guarantee the juvenile’s eventual release, but must
afford the minor a meaningful opportunity for release before
the end of his sentence.66 In this case, 16-year-old Terrance
Graham was charged and convicted of attempted robbery and
later arrested for violating probation by committing a home
invasion robbery with others, holding the victim at gunpoint.67
The trial court gave Graham the maximum sentences for each
charge; he received life imprisonment for armed burglary and
fifteen years for attempted armed robbery.68 Additionally, a
life sentence did not offer a defendant any opportunity for
release unless “granted executive clemency.”69
The Court began with a discussion of the Eighth
Amendment and the Trop test for determining whether the
punishment is cruel and unusual: look to “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
63. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554.
64. Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v.
Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 395 (2006).
65. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 53-54.
68. Id. at 57.
69. Id.
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society.”70
The Court noted that while “the concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment,”71 this
case involved a challenge to a sentence of a term-of-years which
“applies to an entire class of offenders” who have committed
different crimes; therefore, comparing the severity of the
punishment and the seriousness of the crime would not aid in
its analysis.72
Instead, the analysis should begin with the “objective
indicia of [a] national consensus.”73 Disagreeing with the
argument that there is no national consensus on this issue, the
Court stated that legislation is not the sole measure of
consensus, but that sentencing practices factor into this
inquiry.74 Although there is no express ban on juvenile life
without parole, actual sentencing practices demonstrate a
consensus against its use, and recent studies at the time
revealed that throughout the nation, only 109 juvenile
offenders nationwide were serving such a sentence for nonhomicide offenses.75
Noting that a consensus is insufficient to show that a
punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court followed the Roper
reasoning by noting that a juvenile’s culpability, along with the
severity of the crime, must be considered.76 Additionally, the
Court added that, given the fundamental difference between
juveniles and adults,77 and therefore, a lessened or diminished
culpability, a juvenile’s age and the nature of the crime must be
considered, because life without parole is “especially harsh for
juvenile[s],” and deprives them of all liberties with no hope of
restoration.78
70. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
(1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
71. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.
72. Id. at 61.
73. Id. at 62.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 62-63.
76. Graham, 560 U.S at 69 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the
crime each bear on the analysis.”).
77. Id. at 68-69.
78. Id. at 69-70 (“Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than
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The Supreme Court in Graham not only aided in the
development of how juveniles were perceived, but it
significantly advanced the argument.
Building upon the
rationale in Roper, Stamford, and Thompson, the Court began
to place juveniles into a distinct category for purposes of nonhomicidal offenses, truly underscoring the purpose of the
institution of a juvenile justice system. While temporarily
separating a juvenile from society may be necessary, this does
not mean that the juvenile will present a risk to society for
life.79 Furthermore, life imprisonment without parole is not
justified by any goals of incarceration – deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation.80
Though Graham provided that life without parole was
cruel and unusual for non-homicide offenses, the state was not
required to release the offenders during their natural lives;
rather, this decision only prevented the states from making
such a determination from the outset.81
IV. Neuroscience And Social Science Tells Us That
Juveniles Are Different & Require Different Treatment
It is vital to remember that “[i]mmature judgment,
impulsivity, and limited self-control bear directly on
evaluations of criminal responsibility, and developmental and
neuroscientific research inform those assessments.”82 The
Supreme Court in Graham was monumental in cataloging the
differences between juveniles and adults in the justice system.
The Graham ruling was majorly influential in supporting and
expanding upon the notion that juveniles are inherently

an adult offender. A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to life
without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”).
79. Id. at 73 (“A life without parole sentence improperly denies the
juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.
Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth
Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”).
80. Id. at 71.
81. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
82. Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality,
and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth
Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 277 (2013).
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different than adults and therefore have a lesser culpability.83
Though cognitive development studies do not reveal much
support for the assertion that a juvenile at the age of sixteen
“should be viewed as much different than adults,” the juvenile
justice system was not based solely upon the notion of
juveniles’ cognitive capacities, but also upon the notion that
their judgment was less mature.84
The human brain matures in an individual’s early
twenties.85
This developmental feature manifests itself
through the differences that social scientists observe between
juveniles and adults.86 With regard to juveniles’ judgment,
their ability to perceive risk decreases in mid-adolescent years
and begins to increase in adulthood.87 Additionally, feelings of
“[e]xcitement and stress cause youths to make riskier decisions
than adults do.”88 It is no surprise that youths have a lower
perception of risk and behavior than do adults of a fully
developed brain; this difference is precisely because the brain
“governs countless actions, involuntary and voluntary,
physical, mental and emotional.”89
Scientists now utilize Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI),
as opposed to x-rays using radiation, to analyze threedimensional images of the child’s brain and track its
developments over a span of years.90 The findings are telling.
Studies reveal that a teenager’s brain intensely overproduces
gray matter, which is responsible for thinking, and then
discards it rapidly—a period known as pruning.91 After
pruning, development of white matter in the brain—known as
83. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69-70.
84. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on
Adolescents’ Competence and Culpability, 18 QLR 403, 410-11 (1999).
85. Feld, supra note 82, at 286.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 285.
88. Id. at 281.
89. ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL CULPABILITY 1 (2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_sec
tion_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR.].
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1-2.
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myelination—begins, and that white matter creates more
precise and efficient operation of the brain.92
These changes occur through an individual’s early
twenties, and frontal lobe changes occur the most during
adolescence; the frontal lobe is the last part to develop, “which
means that even as they become fully capable in other areas,
adolescents cannot reason as well as adults . . . .”93 While the
prefrontal lobe lags behind, activity in the limbic system,
responsible for control over reflexive or instinctual behavior,
increases.94 Furthermore, science shows that adolescents rely
more on the limbic system than the prefrontal cortex.95
Researcher Jay Giedd states the portion of an adolescent’s
brain that is responsible for organizing, planning, and
strategizing is not fully developed, so it is unfair to expect a
partially-developed brain to act like a fully-developed adult
brain with adult levels of decision-making or organizational
skill.96 It is worth mentioning that there are also major
hormonal and emotional changes that occur in an adolescent’s
brain; for example, adolescent boys experience ten times the
amount of testosterone, which is associated with higher levels
of aggression.97 Thus, since “adolescents are less psychosocially
mature than adults, they are likely to be deficient in their
decision-making capacity, even if their cognitive processes are
mature.”98
In criminal law, there is an underlying assumption “that
offenders must be able to make rational autonomous choices in
order to be held criminally responsible,” and if sciences show
that relevant developmental factors are impeding on a
juvenile’s exercise of free will, then they should be less
blameworthy for their crimes.99 All of the data gathered and
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id.
94. Feld, supra note 82, at 288-289.
95. Id. at 289.
96. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., supra note 89, at 2.
97. Id.
98. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003) (citations
omitted).
99. MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL
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studied from social and neuroscience over the last few decades
lends credence to the notion that juveniles are different, and
the Court has gradually begun to integrate these findings into
solid precedents for juveniles moving forward.
V. One Step Closer to Victory: Miller v. Alabama
In 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama had
occasion to further expand upon Graham ruling. The Supreme
Court held that life sentences without the possibility of parole
for children under the age of eighteen who have committed a
homicide, irrespective of any mitigating circumstances, is cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.100 In this case, two 14-year-olds were convicted of
murder and sentenced to life without parole, without an
alternative sentence, because state law ordered such a sentence
without consideration of the youth, attendant circumstances, or
the nature of the crime.101
The Supreme Court relied on both Roper and Graham to
lend support to the conclusion that mandatory life without
parole violates the Eighth Amendment.102 Not only did the
cases rely on science and social science, but they also
established that a juvenile’s “transient rashness, proclivity for
risk, and inability to assess consequences” lessened culpability
and supported the notion that with continued neurological
development, those tendencies will change.103 Consequently,
such a severe penalty on a juvenile offender cannot be imposed
as though the juvenile was an adult, as it is in complete
contravention of the Eighth Amendment principles,
eliminating any proportionality with the punishment.104
The Court emphasizes the problem with such mandatory
life without parole sentences, and that is the uniform
FOR A JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 43

(Temple Univ. Press 2006).
100. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
101. Id. at 2460 (noting that such a scheme “runs afoul of our cases’
requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most
serious penalties.”).
102. Id. at 2464-65.
103. Id. at 2465.
104. Id. at 2466.
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treatment of every juvenile:105
[E]very juvenile will receive the same sentence
as every other—the 17–year–old and the 14–
year–old, the shooter and the accomplice, the
child from a stable household and the child from
a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each
juvenile (including these two 14–year–olds) will
receive the same sentence as the vast majority of
adults committing similar homicide offenses—
but really, as Graham noted, a greater sentence
than those adults will serve.106
Thus, the Supreme Court noted that the mandatory
sentencing structure eliminates consideration of attendant
circumstances, such as age, and its accompanying features—
family environment and circumstances of the homicidal
offense—which may have accounted for a much lesser
sentence.107 Furthermore, the Court stressed that in imposing
a sentence, the state must take into account how children are
categorically different from adults and how those differences
urge against imposing upon them mandatory life sentences
behind bars.108
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority in Miller v.
Alabama, stated that the Supreme Court has held, on many
prior occasions, “that a sentencing rule permissible for adults
may not be so for children. Capital punishment, our decisions
hold, generally comports with the Eighth Amendment—except
it cannot be imposed on children.”109
Justice Kagan
additionally emphasized that life without parole is
constitutional for non-homicidal offenses for adults, but not for
children, so if “‘death is different,’ children are different too.”110

105. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
106. Id. at 2467-68.
107. Id. at 2468.
108. Id. at 2469.
109. Id. at 2470.
110. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 994 (1991)).
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A. What happens after Miller? Questions of Retroactivity
Miller v. Alabama seemed to make major headway in
juveniles’ plight to be treated differently from adults in the
justice system, but it also left a major area open for debate and
another hurdle to be conquered for those juveniles languishing
behind bars. The major decision was: Should it be applied
retroactively? Given the fact that many were going to be
“potentially affected by the Miller holding, lawyers began
speculating as to its retroactivity even before the ‘ink was dry’
on the decision.”111
For most of the twentieth century, the Court did not
distinguish between cases on direct and collateral review with
regard to retroactivity concerning new constitutional rules.112
Cases on direct review refer to cases on direct appeal, whereas
cases on collateral review refer to cases of post-conviction
challenges after exhaustion of all direct appeals.113 However,
the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane decided that new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply to cases on
direct review but not “to those cases which have become final
before the new rules are announced,” or to cases on collateral
review.114
The Teague doctrine will only apply to cases on collateral
review unless the rule falls under one of two exceptions: 1) to
new substantive rules that “place[] ‘certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe,’” and 2) to “‘watershed’
procedural rules that implicate the fundamental fairness and
the accuracy of the conviction.”115 The Miller decision left the
state and federal courts to grapple with the meaning and
exceptions of the retroactivity doctrine provided for by Teague
and to determine how Miller would apply to juveniles whose
cases are now final.
111. Levick & Shwartz, supra note 35, at 375.
112. Brianna H. Boone, Note, Treating Adults Like Children: ReSentencing Adult Juvenile Lifers After Miller v. Alabama, 99 MINN. L. REV.
1159, 1166 (2015).
113. Id.
114. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
115. Boone, supra note 112, at 1166-67 (citation omitted).
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VI. The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana: Miller applies retroactively
On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court handed down a
six-to-three ruling, holding that the Court not only had
jurisdiction to review a state supreme court’s refusal to apply
Miller v. Alabama retroactively, but also made the
monumental and long-awaited decision on an uncertain ruling
– Miller applies retroactively in cases on state collateral
review.116 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 17-year-old Petitioner
killed a sheriff in 1963, and he received a mandatory life
sentence without parole.117 The trial court denied his collateral
appeal after Miller because the court determined that Miller
did not apply retroactively in cases on state collateral review.118
Collateral review is a post-conviction appeal that is left up
to the discretion of the court.119 The Supreme Court, a few
short months ago, finally addressed the question of whether
states “required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive
effect to new substantive or watershed procedural rules.”120
The Court noted that if the outcome of the case depends on the
new substantive rule, then in cases on state collateral review,
the court must apply the rule retroactively.121 The Court
further stated that a court cannot have the power to allow a
conviction or sentence, in violation of a new substantive rule, to
stand whether or not there is a final conviction or sentence
before the rule is announced.122
Thus, the Court held that, because Miller ruled that life
without parole for juvenile offenders (except for extreme cases)
116. SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 36.
117. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725-26 (2016).
118. Id. at 727.
119. What Are the Different Kinds of Appeals? What Is an Appeal of
Right, or a Discretionary Appeal? What Is the Difference Between “Direct” and
“Collateral”
Appeals?,
ROTTENSTEIN
L.
GRP.
LLP,
http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-are-the-different-kinds-of-appealswhat-is-an-appeal-of-right-or-a-discretionary-appeal-whats-the-differencebetween-direct-and-collateral-appeals (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
120. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.
121. Id. at 729.
122. Id.
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is excessive, this qualifies as a new substantive rule because a
majority of juvenile offenders would remain carrying out a
punishment that is no longer allowed to be handed down on
their class.123 The Supreme Court decided that “[t]here is no
grandfather clause that permits States to enforce punishments
the Constitution forbids.”124 Further, the Court notes that,
although Miller held that life without parole could be a
proportionate sentence in cases where the child’s crimes
“reflect irreparable corruption,” it “does not mean that all other
children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have
not suffered the deprivation of a substantive right.”125
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the very nature of
children that the string of juvenile cases before this Court had
concluded; that is, that children are different and they possess
many different characteristics that essentially make them
inherently less culpable.126 Also noted was the fact that
children go through a period of “transient immaturity,” and to
reflect this reality, many juvenile offenders now imprisoned
should be eligible for parole so that they are not forced to “serve
a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”127
VII. Implications Moving Forward
You may ask, what happens now? With this long-awaited
Supreme Court decision now published, over 2,000 eager
juveniles serving life without parole are squirming in their
cells at the chance to be eligible for parole.128 This ruling is a
double-edged sword. Yes, this is a good thing, because our
legal system does not allow for juveniles to face
unconstitutional punishments in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, the problem now is that each state
123. Id. at 734.
124. Id. at 731.
125. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
126. Id. at 736.
127. Id.
128. Jesse Wegman, Supreme Court Revisits Life Sentences for
Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014, 9:24 AM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/supreme-court-revisits-lifesentences-for-juveniles/.
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must deal with each case individually and carefully, and this
will be a difficult process. States will now have to develop a
game plan to determine exactly how to deal with these
juveniles.
The following is an excerpt from Montgomery v. Louisiana,
and it shows just how much is now left for state courts to deal
with:
Extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders
does not impose an onerous burden on the States,
nor does it disturb the finality of state
convictions. Those prisoners who have shown an
inability to reform will continue to serve life
sentences. The opportunity for release will be
afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of
Miller’s central intuition—that children who
commit even heinous crimes are capable of
change.129
This now gives the States authority to decide whether to
come up with new sentences or, alternatively, grant parole
subject to future conditions of the juvenile’s behavior.130 Now,
juveniles have the opportunity to explain that, at the time they
were sentenced, they were not unable to be rehabilitated, and
to prove that they can offer instances of good behavior since
incarceration.131
There is another very obvious problem glaring back at the
states. The problem is how courts are going to deal with the
evidence presented by the juveniles as to their ability for
rehabilitation at the time they were sentenced. Furthermore,
how will the courts deal with the evidence of good behavior?
Surely, not all that is presented by every juvenile can be simply
put on an equal playing field. Each case is different from the
next, so these differences raise difficult questions of application
that the states must grapple with and deal with fast.
129. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
130. Id.
131. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life Sentences
for Youthful Criminals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:26 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-lifesentences-for-youthful-criminals/.
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The states will now also have to create some systematic
approach as to how they will begin to handle a small floodgate
of juveniles attempting to free themselves of the legal system.
Finding a system that will determine which cases will be heard
first and creating lists of major factors needed to be met for the
eligibility criteria. On the one hand, there needs to be some
generally-established set of procedures that the states can
follow across the spectrum of cases to process each effectively.
On the other hand, the states must come up with ways that
will not just lump cases into a general set of factors and
guidelines. The states need to account for the fact that every
case must also be reviewed individually with regard to the
factors that are pertinent to each particular case.
B. The Decision in Effect: A Chance to Start Over
Just months after this monumental Supreme Court ruling,
news clips and snippets are beginning to pop up daily. Decadeold cases are now being revisited, and those juveniles, now
adults, may just have a chance at a second life.
On April 8, 2016, Alex Wong received the news that he
would be eligible for parole in five years.132 Alex Wong has
been serving a life sentence since 1989; he was sentenced to life
in prison at the young age of sixteen after killing two people at
a restaurant for a Chinese gang, the Green Dragons.133 Mr.
Wong is now 43-years-old, and he became choked up with
emotion as he stood before Judge Dearie pleading for a second
chance: “What I tried to find on the street I had all along in my
family. I would like for the second half of my life to help the
people that helped me.”134
On Saturday, April 30, 2016, after serving forty-one years
on a life sentence (eight of those years spent in solitary
confinement), Gary Tyler was released from a notorious

132. John Marzulli, Gang Member Sentenced to Life in Prison as a Teen
Will Get Second Chance at Life Outside Prison, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8,
2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/teen-gangmember-sentenced-life-chance-article-1.2593811.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Louisiana prison.135 He, too, was 16-years-old when he was
sentenced to death in 1974 for the killing of a 13-year-old white
student; Gary Tyler was passing through a group of rowdy
white students on a bus filled with black students, and the
police later captured a gun.136 Even though the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized that his trial was unfair, Gary
Tyler still did not receive a new trial.137 Instead, Tyler’s death
sentence was later commuted to a life sentence after
Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty was determined
unconstitutional.138 Gary Tyler has since been completely freed
from this now unconstitutional sentence, and the shackles on
his life are finally let loose.
In this recent trend of avoiding such harsh sentences for
juvenile offenders, states will need to, and are, making difficult
decisions regarding the evaluation of a juvenile offender
coming before a parole board for a chance at early release.
Iowa is one such state making headway on such an uncertain
area; on May 27, 2016, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled in a split
decision that “sentencing juveniles to life in prison without
parole is unconstitutional because it amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment.”139 This ruling followed the decision in
2012 involving Isaiah Sweet, who was the first juvenile to be
sentenced to life without parole in Iowa after Miller v.
Alabama; he was 17-years-old at the time he murdered his
grandparents with an assault rifle.140 Individual circumstances
were considered at the time of his sentencing, and a
psychologist testified that Mr. Sweet’s likelihood of
rehabilitation would be clearer at the age of thirty.141
The Iowa Supreme Court noted that, since determining
135. Ram Eachambadi, Lousiana [sic] Prisoner Freed After Serving 41
Years Unconstitutional Sentence, JURIST (Apr. 30, 2016, 5:54 PM),
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/04/lousiana-prisoner-freed-afterserving-41-year-unconstitutional-sentence.php.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Dave Philipps, Iowa Court Rejects Life Without Parole for Juveniles,
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/us/lifesentences-juveniles-iowa-isaiah-sweet.html?_r=0.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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whether the juvenile is “irretrievably corrupt” is near
impossible when, in the given case, not even trained
professionals attempt to make this determination, “future
parole boards would be better suited to make the
determination.”142 While the Iowa Court has ruled that future
parole boards are better suited to make the determination of
whether a juvenile is “irretrievably corrupt,” how exactly will
that determination be made?
How is a juvenile to be
determined as “irretrievably corrupt?”
While some adults are now preparing to enter the world
after decades growing up behind prison bars, some are still
fighting for a chance at life. On Friday, September 23, 2016, a
judge in Kent County, Michigan, resentenced David Samel, 52years-old and behind bars for thirty-five years, to 34½ to 60
years in prison, which made him immediately eligible for
parole.143 All that is left for David Samel is to wait for a state
parole board’s determination as to whether or not he will be
released from the place that he has been confined to since he
was just 17-years-old.144 While things are looking brighter for
David Samel, if the state board parole denies his release, in
theory, he could be forced to serve the remainder of the new
sentence: sixty years. If this is his fate, Samel will be 77-yearsold at the time of his release.
VI. Conclusion
There is a lot of uncertainty, but one thing is not
uncertain: juvenile life without parole is no longer
constitutional; over 2,000 juvenile offenders are languishing in
jail serving a punishment that is no longer constitutionally
valid.145 States must now act swiftly. States must first devise
a method by which they will begin hearing these cases. Will
they be heard at random? Will they be heard on a “first come,
first serve” basis? Will it be those juveniles who have served
142. Id.
143. John Tunison, Imprisoned for 34 Years, Juvenile Lifer Gets Shot at
Parole, MLIVE (Sept. 24, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/index.ssf/2016/09/imprisoned_for_34_years_juveni.html.
144. Id.
145. Wegman, supra note 128.
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the longest on their sentence? There must then be a list of
important and thoroughly analyzed factors for the courts to
consider and deem necessary in order to consider parole and
the potential release of these once juvenile offenders.
Decisions as to each particular case need to be carefully
examined and made in order to ensure that there is proper
justice in each case. However, there is a glaring problem
staring back at the courts after this Supreme Court decision. A
juvenile can still receive long consecutive sentences, potentially
living up to half of his or her life in prison, which begs the
question: Isn’t this just as cruel and unusual, and therefore
unconstitutional, as a life sentence, for the very same reasons?
Furthermore, are there proper procedures in place to
handle these former juvenile lifers’ reentry into society? What
is needed to acclimate the oldest juvenile lifer in the state of
Philadelphia, Joseph Ligon? Ligon is now a 78-year-old man
who has been incarcerated since 1956.146 What does he need in
order to get acclimated into a society that is not behind bars, a
society he no longer has any firm ties to? Pennsylvania
Corrections Secretary John Wetzel notes some immense
difficulties with getting ready for the release of these juvenile
lifers; according to Samantha Melamed of The Philadelphia
Inquirer, the change is a “transition from a world where time
moved slowly to one where the pace is frenzied, and from a
place with no choices to one where the simplest transaction buying toothpaste, ordering off a menu - involves a dozen
decisions.”147

146. Samantha Melamed, After Decades Behind Bars, Juvenile Lifers are
Released - but to What?, PHILLY.COM (July 11, 2016, 3:01 AM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160711_After_decades_behind_bars__ju
venile_lifers_are_released_-_but_to_what_.html.
147. Id.
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